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When is Uniformity of People, Not Counties,
Appropriate in Election Administration? The
Cases of Early and Sunday Voting
Richard L. Hasent

I.

INTRODUCTION

Almost a decade and a half since the Supreme Court's
controversial decision in Bush v. Gore,' no one knows what the
case's Equal Protection principle means or if it exists at all. As
scholarS 2 and lower courtS 3 hotly debate the scope of the case
that ended the disputed 2000 presidential election, the Supreme
Court itself has remained silent. The case garnered a mere
single mention at the Court in a 2013 concurring opinion signed
only by Justice Thomas, which did not consider Equal
Protection issues. 4

Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law.
Thanks to participants at The University of Chicago Legal Forum 2014 Symposium, to
David Kimball for his useful comments and suggestions, and to participants in the 2014
APSA panel on the Presidential Commission on Election Administration whose
discussion inspired this paper.
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
For some of the scholarly commentary on equal protection principles, see
generally Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and ConstitutionalLaw, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1836 (2013); Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the
Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865 (2013) [hereinafter, Hasen,
2012 Voting Wars]; Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore?, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 925,
991-98 (2007); Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Meaning of Bush v. Gore, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1007, 1026-27 (2007); Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It to the Lower Courts: On Judicial
Intervention in Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065, 1068-72 (2007); Nelson
Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219, 1263-65
(2002); Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in
Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 386-87 (2001) [hereinafter Hasen, Future of Equal
Protection].
3 See generally Hasen, 2012 Voting Wars, supra note 2; see also Richard L. Hasen,
The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9-15 (2007).
4 Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2268 n. 2 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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Republican George W. Bush was slightly ahead of Democrat
Al Gore in the initial Florida vote count, the state whose
Electoral College votes would determine the United States'
forty-third President.5 Gore demanded a series of ballot
recounts, some of which narrowed the lead to a little over 500
votes. He then requested a recount of "undervoted" ballots
(ballots not recording a vote for president) in four heavily
Democratic Florida counties. Many Florida voters voted using
unreliable "punch card" ballots, and vote totals depended upon
election officials judging a voter's intent by examining punchedout holes (or chad) in ballot cards. The Florida Supreme Court
ordered a recount of "undervoted" ballots across all Florida
counties. Bush went to the U.S. Supreme Court to stop
further recounting.
Attorneys for Bush put forward an expansive understanding
of Equal Protection principles. They argued against the ability of
officials and courts to include in vote totals recounted ballots in
which the recounts were conducted, or would be conducted,
using inconsistent standards both within and between counties
for what counted as a valid vote. The Court had never before
applied Equal Protection principles to the "nuts and bolts" of
elections. Attorneys for Gore argued for a narrow application of
Equal Protection principles. The Supreme Court sided with
Bush, holding that conducting a recount with inconsistent
standards across and within counties violated the Equal
Protection Clause.6
The jurisprudential positions of the parties in the original
Bush v. Gore case were somewhat odd given their usual political
commitments. Republicans usually argue in election cases for
narrow Equal Protection rules and Democrats for broad ones.
For example, in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,7 the
2008 challenge to Indiana's voter identification law,8 democrats
argued for a muscular reading of the Equal Protection Clause to
block laws requiring a voter to provide certain kinds of
A full account of the 2000 Florida dispute, from which my account in the next two
paragraphs below draws, appears in Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars, supra note 2,
at 41-73 (2012).
6 See generally Hasen, Future of Equal Protection, supra note 2 (describing Bush v.
Gore as the first case to address Equal Protection issues in the "nuts and bolts" of
elections).
553 U.S. 181 (2008).
See generally id.
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photographic identification to be eligible to cast a ballot,
contending that such laws discriminated against the poor and
others who were unlikely to have the right form of
identification.9 Republicans, in contrast, argued for a narrower
reading of Equal Protection principles, which would allow states
to require photo identification to be used.10 In that challenge, the
Supreme Court agreed with the narrower reading of Equal
Protection Republicans favored.
Despite the apparent tension between jurisprudence and
politics, in the decade and a half since Bush v. Gore, Republicans
have stuck with their Bush v. Gore-type broader call for
uniformity in election administration rules across a state. For
example, Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted, a Republican, has
consistently insisted upon uniform hours for early voting in the
State of Ohio, citing Equal Protection grounds. Reacting to a
2014 ruling challenging his ability to set uniform voting rules,
Husted declared:
My overarching principle for Ohio's long-debated voting
schedule is that all voters, no matter where they live,
should have the same opportunity to vote. That's why I
have set uniform voting hours for all 88 counties and why
I sent absentee ballot applications to voters statewide, so
there would be no disparity in access."
Georgia Governor Nathan Deal, also a Republican, similarly
argued for uniformity in voting days, and rejected the
proposition that different counties in Georgia should be allowed
to decide whether or not to have Sunday voting in the early
voting period before Election Day. He said Sunday voting is
"certainly the departure from the norm. And it apparently has a
partisan purpose behind-at least they admit it has a partisan
purpose behind it of trying to increase the Democratic
turnout."1 2 He added: "I don't think anything that has to do with
9 Initial Brief: Appellant-Petitioner at 49-63, Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election
Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
1o Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent at 21-29, Crawford v. Marion Cnty Election
Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
11 Statement from Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted, Ohio Secretary of State
(Sept. 4, 2014), available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/mediaCenter/2014/2014-0904-a.aspx, archived at http: //perma.cc/A6FV-LLYW.
12 Greg Bluestein, Nathan Deal Says He's
No Fan of DeKalb's Sunday Voting,
POLITICAL INSIDER BLOG, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 10, 2014), available at

196

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2015

elections should be tilted one way or the other for partisan
purposes."13
At a 2014 panel at the American Political Science
Association, prominent Republican attorney (and former
Romney for President general counsel) Ben Ginsberg objected
when political scientist David Kimball called for local
jurisdictions to have more flexibility in voting hours and
locations for early voting. Ginsberg saw this as a "partisan" view
of election administration and objected, arguing that early
voting hours need to be uniform across all jurisdictions in
a state. 14
Yet there is a fundamental flaw in the blanket calls for
uniformity across counties (or electoral jurisdictions) in the
name of equal protection principles based on Bush v. Goreuniformity across counties sometimes undermines the Equal
Protection rights of voters because counties have different size
populations. In this short Essay, I argue that election
administration rules premised on uniformity of counties violate
Bush v. Gore or other equal protection principles whenever a
rule of election administration treats differently populated
counties the same, but the relevant rule significantly affects the
level of services provided to individual voters.
Indeed, even if Bush v. Gore ultimately has no precedential
value (or no precedential value outside the narrow confines of a
case involving statewide recounts of votes), uniform election law
treatment across counties sometimes violates "one person, one
vote" principles and is unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause. Using this analysis, I conclude that
requirements of uniform early voting days and times across
counties could well be unconstitutional, but a ban on Sunday
voting would likely be constitutional so long as the number of
hours offered to voters overall gives voters in different counties
roughly the same opportunities to vote. Challengers to a
statewide ban on Sunday voting, or to leaving the choice
discretionary to counties, would have to raise a different Equal
Protection theory.
http: //politics.blogajc.com/2014/09/10/nathan-deal-says-hes-no-fan-of-dekalbs-sundayvoting/, archived at http://perma.cclKX3X-3K52.
13
id.
14 E-mail from David C. Kimball, Professor of Political Science, University of
Missouri-St. Louis, to author (Sept. 12, 2014) (on file with author) (recounting discussion
at American Political Science Association meeting).
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UNIFORMITY OF WHAT?

Arguments that the time and dates of early voting should be
uniform across a state have facial appeal. After all, if voters in
Democratic urban areas have longer early voting hours than in
other parts of the state, or if African-American voters (who
overwhelmingly vote Democratic) are especially apt to take
advantage of Sunday voting through "Souls to the Polls" events
with buses going from church to voting, then extended hours or
Sunday voting could appear to give Democrats an unfair
advantage.' 5 Indeed, some Democrats suspect that the reason
Republicans
have pushed
for uniformity
in election
Democrats
of
administration across states is precisely to deprive
this advantage. Ohio State Senator Nina Turner, who later ran
unsuccessfully for Secretary of State against Husted, said of
Husted's push for uniform voting days that "this is no more than
uniform voter suppression, make no mistake about it."16
Similarly, some Republicans suspect that the reason Democrats
have argued against uniformity is to give Democrats partisan
advantage, as evidenced by Georgia Governor Deal's recent
statements opposing Sunday voting in Democratic counties as
having a "partisan purpose."17
Both of these sentiments could well be true. The parties'
positions on uniformity could well be partially (if subconsciously)
motivated by the partisan consequences of the rules. This is
inevitable in a system of election administration not conducted
behind a veil of ignorance or at least by non-partisan election
officials whose allegiance is to the integrity of the process and
not to a political party.
I want to step away from this partisan fight and concern
over motivations, and instead examine the question of equal
protection principles and uniformity. Consider two examples to

15 Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808, 839-41 (S.D. Ohio
2014) (describing "Souls to the Polls" in the context of a challenge under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause); Florida v. United States, 885 F.
Supp. 2d 299, 335-36 (D.D.C. 2012) (describing "Souls to the Polls" in context of Voting
Rights Act section 5 retrogression analysis).
1s Adalia Woodbury, Ohio's Former SOS Obliterates Husted's Uniformity and
Fairness Claim, POLITICUSUSA (Aug. 24, 2012, 12:21 PM), available at
http://www.politicususa.com/2012/08/24/husted-continues-block-vote-ohio.html, archived
at http: //perma.cc/VF8Z-VV48.
17 Bluestein, supra note 12 (quoting Gov.
Deal).
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flesh out how uniformity principles should apply in election
administration decisions across counties:
1. In the name of uniformity, the chief election official of the
state declares that each county in the state shall have the same
number of voting machines. The largest county in the state has
a population of about 10 million; the smallest county has a
population of about 3,000.18
2. In the name of uniformity, the chief election official of a
state declares that each county in the state must follow the
same standards for ballot format and typeface and follow the
same rules for listing of candidates on the ballot.
The two examples demonstrate that uniformity across
counties sometimes is appropriate
and sometimes is
inappropriate and perhaps unconstitutional. In the first
example, involving the number of voting machines, uniformity
across counties would be manifestly inappropriate and almost
certainly unconstitutional. The problem arises because a
uniformity requirement as to the number of voting machines
(unless the number is set ridiculously high) is likely to put much
greater burdens on voters in large counties than in small ones.
Requiring each county to have exactly 30 voting machines, for
example, means that there would be one voting machine per 100
people in the smallest county, and one voting machine per
333,333 people in the largest county. The obvious implication of
such a dire disparity is that many voters in the larger counties
would be effectively disenfranchised. 19 Whether or not Bush v.
Gore applies to the question of the voting machine per person
disparity, 20 such a severe burden on voting would likely be
unconstitutional both under the line of cases subjecting severe
1s This describes California in July 2013, according
to Census Department figures.
Los Angeles County has a population of 10,017,068; Sierra County has a population of
3,047. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population:April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2013, U.S.
Census Bureau, Population Division (March 2014), available at http://factfinder2.
census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml, archived at http: //perma.cc/5KUV-XA3V.
19 See Christopher Famighetti, Amanda Melillo, & Myrna Perez, Election Day Long

Lines: Resource Allocation, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE REPORT (Sept. 15, 2014),

available
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Election
DayLongLines-ResourceAllocation.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5UA7-RV9J (finding
that voting machine distribution had a significant impact on voter waiting time); Charles
Stewart III, Waiting to Vote in 2012, 28 J. L. & POL. 439 (2013) (discussing how long
wait times for voting can deter voters).
20 For a discussion of whether Bush v. Gore is violated when one county
uses voting
machines with much higher error rates than other counties in a statewide election see
generally Hasen, Future of Equal Protection, supra note 2.
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burdens on voters to strict scrutiny (the so-called AndersonBurdick line of cases), 21 as well as, under the "one person, one
vote" cases, making it unconstitutional to more heavily weigh
votes in some parts of a state rather than others. 22 It cannot be
that some voters would have only a small chance of being able to
cast a ballot thanks to a lack of voting machines caused by a
state edict requiring uniformity in the number of machines.
In contrast, a rule requiring uniformity across counties in
setting the standards for ballot formats and the listing of
candidates on the ballot is unobjectionable and not even
remotely unconstitutional. Indeed, such uniformity can promote
fairness and sound election administration, reduce costs, and
minimize voter confusion, such as when the state mandates
clear ballot formatting that everyone will expect no matter
where they vote in the state. 23 No one in bigger or smaller
counties is at an advantage or disadvantage under such rules.
Both of the election officials' orders require uniformity
across counties, yet one is unconstitutional and the other is not
only constitutional but commendable. What's the difference?
Some election administration choices, such as determining the
proper number of voting machines, involve providing services to
voters individually to facilitate the voting process. When the
election administration rule significantly affects the level of
services to voters, the uniformity principle should be tied to the
number of voters and not the county unit. Thus, the proper way
of proceeding with setting the number of voting machines is for
election officials to base it upon the number of voters (e.g., one

21 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi,
504 U.S.
428 (1992). On the Anderson-Burdick sliding scale balancing test, see RICHARD L.

HASEN, LEGISLATION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION & ELECTION LAW: EXAMPLES AND

EXPLANATIONS 262-63, 307-11 (2014); Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward B. Foley,
Gatekeeping v. Balancing in the Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodological
Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 507 (2008).
22
See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1 (1964); see also Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969)
(holding government may not discriminate among citizen, resident, adult non-felons'
enfranchisement in school board elections).
23 Candidates, in advance, may prefer the random rotation of candidate names on
the ballot across the state, so that no candidate gets a preferential ballot position. There
is some dispute over how much the "ballot order effect" matters, but rotation eliminates
any danger of such effect. See generally R. Michael Alvarez, Betsy Sinclair, & Richard L.
Hasen, How Much is Enough? The "Ballot Order" Effect and the Use of Social Science
Evidence in Election Law Disputes, 5 ELECTION L.J. 40 (2006).
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voting machine for every 3,000 voters in a jurisdiction) rather
than upon the number of counties.
Such a rule is supported by Bush v. Gore itself. As the Court
described it, the problem with the disparate rules for the
counting and recounting of ballots by examining voting "punch
cards" was one that existed not only between counties but within
counties. 24 Thus, the problem was inconsistency in the
treatment of similar ballots across the state of Florida, and not
simply differences from county to county.
Other election administration choices, such as determining
the format of the ballot, do not involve providing services to
voters individually to facilitate the voting process. Instead, rules
election administrators set in formatting ballots, dealing with
internal processes, or conducting recounts are permissibly set
uniformly across counties when appropriate. 25 The proper way of
deciding on proper ballot design or the listing of candidates
depends in no way upon the number of voters in each county.
For rules involving the provision of services to voters, like
those setting the same number of voting machines across
counties, imposing uniformity across counties with vastly
different population sizes can cause greater burdens on voters in
geographically larger counties. For rules which do not involve

The want of [uniform recount] rules here has led to unequal evaluation of
ballots in various respects. As seems to have been acknowledged at oral
argument, the standards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots might vary
not only from county to county but indeed within a single county from one
recount team to another.
24

The record provides some examples. A monitor in Miami-Dade County testified
at trial that he observed that three members of the county canvassing board
applied different standards in defining a legal vote. And testimony at trial also
revealed that at least one county changed its evaluative standards during the
counting process. Palm Beach County, for example, began the process with a
1990 guideline which precluded counting completely attached chads, switched
to a rule that considered a vote to be legal if any light could be seen through a
chad, changed back to the 1990 rule, and then abandoned any pretense of a per
se rule, only to have a court order that the county consider dimpled chads legal.
This is not a process with sufficient guarantees of equal treatment.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
25 Uniform recount rules would not be appropriate if jurisdictions
used different
voting technology for casting ballots. For example, if some counties use DRE (electronic)
voting machines and other counties use optically scanned ballots filled in with pencils,
the rules for recounts will necessarily be different. Courts have thus far rejected
arguments that it is an Equal Protection violation to use DRE machines in some counties
which, because of the nature of the technology, are not subject to ordinary recount rules.
Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2006).
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the provision of services to voters, like those setting uniform
ballot typeface, the fact that a uniform state rule is
administered through county election officials is happenstance,
and the choice of uniform rule has no differential effect on voters
across counties in a state.
Further, electoral jurisdictions differ drastically in size and
the populations they serve. As Kimball, Baybeck, and
Deppen found:
[R]oughly 6 percent of the local jurisdictions served a bit
more than two-thirds of the voters in the 2012 election.
Meanwhile, the thirty most populated jurisdictions serve
more than 20 percent of the nation's voters. When casting
their ballots, the vast majority of American voters are
served by a very small number of heavily populated local
jurisdictions. 26
Uniformity often makes sense when the rules do not depend
upon the level of services provided to voters. In contrast,
uniformity across counties that significantly affects the level of
services provided to voters is constitutionally suspect.
III. UNIFORM EARLY VOTING DAYS AND HOURS V. UNIFORM BAN
ON SUNDAY VOTING
Early voting hours appear to fit into the first category of

cases, involving provision of services to voters. Just like the
number of voting machines should be calibrated not to the
number of counties but to the number of voters per voting
machine, the number of hours or days of early voting should not
be uniform across counties but should instead be tied to the
capacity of polling places to accommodate voters in the
jurisdiction. For example, if a state election administrator
adopted
the
Presidential
Commission
on
Election
Administration recommendation that voters should have to wait
no more than 30 minutes to vote, 27 and if the administrator
26 David C. Kimball, Brady Baybeck, & Ray Deppen,
Under the Radar: State
Associationsand Election Administration, Paper prepared for presentation at the annual
meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Apr. 4, 2014 (on file with
the author).
27 The
American Voting Experience: Report and Recommendations of the
Presidential Commission on Election Administration, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 2014 at 14), available at https://www.supportthevoter.
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applied that recommendation to early voting throughout the
state, election officials in large counties might need to schedule
many more hours of early voting to handle capacity and meet
this benchmark than election administrators in sparsely
populated counties.
Thus, while Ohio Secretary of State Husted's insistence on
uniformity in early voting days and hours at first looks
defensible under Equal Protection principles, in fact it can
undermine election administration principles if it places
significantly greater burdens on voters in larger counties than in
smaller counties. Perhaps for this reason, a federal district court
in 2014 ordered Husted to allow counties to add additional early
voting hours. 28
Other early voting practices enacted in the name of
uniformity may raise similar issues. If the state requires that
counties offer only one polling place for early voting per county,
then the location of the polling place could have disparate affects
across voters in a geographically dispersed county. Further, a
single polling location could mean much longer lines for early
voting in high population counties than in small population
counties, much like the voting machine hypothetical
mentioned earlier.
As a constitutional matter, the difference must be
significant enough substantively to warrant court intervention.
We cannot have courts policing all minor deviations in voting
conditions because this will clog up the courts without providing
significant benefits to voters. If rural voters generally wait no
more than 5 minutes to vote and urban voters wait 20 minutes
to vote, courts should not find a violation even though urban
voters wait four times as long as rural voters. Similarly, in Ohio,
28 days of early voting is quite generous, and perhaps the

gov/files/2014/01/Amer-Voting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf,
archived at http://
perma.cc/8AXC-94LU ("The Commission has determined that, as a general rule, no voter
should have to wait more than half an hour to have an opportunity to vote.") (emphasis
omitted).
28 Jackie Borchardt, Early Voting Schedule Expanded by Secretary of
State Jon
Husted While Court Decision Under Appeal, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Sept. 15, 2014),
available at http: //www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2014/09/early voting-schedule
.expanded.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U3X3-LWUF ('"he judge's order also
prohibits Husted from preventing local boards from setting hours in addition to the
statewide schedule. Husted appealed the decision because he said it is inconsistent with
the judge's past decisions, which stated that Ohio could not treat one group of voters
differently from another.").
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uniformity rule applied there would not be unconstitutional
because it did not significantly limit the voting opportunities for
voters in more populated areas. Courts will have to use common
sense to separate the line between de minimis costs and more
onerous ones.
The ban on Sunday voting question is more difficult. Like
the early voting issue, the ban on Sunday voting involves the
provision of services to voters. However, a ban on Sunday voting
itself does not necessarily limit the total amount of services
provided to voters. Under the principles I have set forth above, a
ban on Sunday voting would be constitutional under the
uniformity principle so long as the ban did not interfere with
local election officials' ability to otherwise set enough hours to
comply with a benchmark in terms of voter waiting time.
To argue that a ban on Sunday voting is unconstitutional
requires a different type of equal protection argument, such as
an argument that the ban constitutes an impermissible form of
discrimination. Suppose urban areas contain poorer people who
tend to work more hours, and who would have an easier time
voting if jurisdictions held voting in these areas on Sundays.
Further, suppose African-American churches use "Souls to the
Polls" campaigns to get African-American voters to the polls. Is
a statewide ban on Sunday voting enacted in the name of
uniformity constitutional and acceptable, even if it means that
voters in the urban areas on average are inconvenienced more
by the voting schedule than voters in other areas?
Under these circumstances, if plaintiffs could show that
state officials banned Sunday voting in the name of uniformity
as a pretext for discriminating against African-American voters,
such conduct is likely unconstitutional. Consider the views of
Georgia State Senator Fran Millar, who lamented an increase in
African-American voting thanks to Sunday voting days, 29 and
29
Daniel Malloy, Jim Galloway, & Greg Bluestein, David Purdue is Bach on the Air,
Jean-Jacketed but Baby-less, POLITICAL INSIDER BLOG, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 9,
2014), available at http: /politics.blog.ajc.com/2014/09/09/david-perdue-is-back-on-theair-jean-jacketed-but-baby-less/, archived at http://perma.cc/X2XD-V8TA:

Now we are to have Sunday voting at South DeKalb Mall just prior to the
election. Per Jim Galloway of the AJC, this location is dominated by African
American shoppers and it is near several large African American mega
churches such as New Birth Missionary Baptist. Galloway also points out the
Democratic Party thinks this is a wonderful idea-what a surprise. I'm sure
Michelle Nunn and Jason Carter are delighted with this blatantly partisan
move in DeKalb.
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when pushed, explained that he simply wanted "more educated
voters" voting on Election Day. 30 Arguably these statements
could lead a court to find racially discriminatory intent and hold
the ban unconstitutional.
Even without proof of racial discrimination, if election
officials imposed a ban on Sunday voting and had no sound
election administration reasons (and perhaps solely partisan
reasons) for doing so, it is possible a court applying expansive
equal protection principles could find this to be a violation. Such
a result could be accomplished through an expansion of the
Anderson-Burdick principles (which impose strict scrutiny only
in the case of severe burdens on voters, and not for more minor
burdens, such as a ban on Sunday voting) to require election
administrators to maximize convenience of voters. Alternatively,
a court might expand voting protections for the poor. Finally, a
court might hold that once a state offers Sunday voting or other
voting conveniences, it may not take those benefits away
without good reason (a type of "non-retrogression" principle). 31
These latter sets of arguments go well beyond my claim about
uniformity and election administration and are beyond the scope
of this Essay. 32
Although it may be constitutionally permissible for states to
ban Sunday voting in the name of uniformity (at least if no other
constitutional principle comes into play) such a ban is not
necessarily good policy. For those who believe voting should be
Id.

*30 Hunter Schwartz, Georgia State Senator Upset Over Efforts in Increase Voter
Turnout in Black, DemocraticArea, GOvBEAT, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2014), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.comfblogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/10/georgia-state-senator-up
set-over-efforts-to-increase-black-voter-turnout-says-he-wants-more-educated-voters/,
archived at http://perma.cc/PGA7-D9BJ ("Later [he said] that he would 'prefer more
educated voters than a greater increase in the number of voters."').
31 See Edward B. Foley, Ohio Early Voting Case: A Potential Precedent Setter,
ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ, Sept. 4, 2014, available at http: /moritzlaw.osu.edulelectionlaw/article/?article=12851, archived at http://perma.cc/AP37-GXD3 (discussing the
potential expansion of the non-retrogression principle as it appeared to be applied in
Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted).
3' For an argument that courts should expand Equal Protection principles and not
allow courts to impose more than minor burdens on voters without evidence of a sound
election administration reason to do so, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?
How Courts Should Think About Efforts to Make It Harderto Vote in North Carolinaand
Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58 (2014) ("When a legislature passes an electionadministration law discriminating against a party's voters or otherwise burdening
voters, courts should read the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to
require the legislature to produce real and substantial evidence that it has good reason
for burdening voters and that its means are closely connected to achieving those ends.").

THE CASES OF EARLY AND SUNDAY VOTING

193]

205

as easy and convenient as possible, Sunday voting has much to
commend it. Many people are not working and therefore have
more flexible schedules (and a greater ability to wait in line to
vote); parents can take children with them to vote, inculcating
them with the value of voting; and the more people who can vote
during the early voting period, including Sundays, the less likely
it is that there will be bottlenecks and problems on Election
Day. But for something to be good policy does not mean it is
constitutionally mandated.
IV.

WHEN IS COUNTY DISCRETION PERMISSIBLE IN SETTING
EARLY AND SUNDAY VOTING?

Suppose the state allows counties to decide whether to offer
early or Sunday voting or not, and some counties offer early or
Sunday voting while others do not. It might be that only urban
counties with many poorer and Democratic voters offer early or
Sunday voting and rural counties do not. Or perhaps only rural
counties offer early or Sunday voting and urban counties with
many poorer and Democratic voters do not.
The principles I have set forth so far do not directly answer
the question whether such discretion may violate the Equal
Protection Clause. I have only set forth the circumstances in
which it may be an equal protection violation for a state to
mandate uniformity in election administration: a state may not
mandate uniformity across counties when the question
significantly affects the level of services provided to each voter.
In contrast, in the case of granting counties discretion to set
rules, the state has allowed local variation on this question. Is
such local discretion permissible?
The constitutional answer is unclear. In Bush v. Gore," the
Court suggested that variation in election rules to deal with
local conditions is not an equal protection violation. The Court
declared that "The question before the Court is not whether local
entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different
systems for implementing elections . . . . Our consideration is
limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal
protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities." 34 Thus, even if Bush v. Gore has precedential

"
3

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Id. at 108. These sentences of course were controversial on the question whether
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value, it may not extend to decisions made in the exercise of
local discretion.
On the other hand, if county discretion leads to significantly
greater opportunities to vote for voters in some counties rather
than others, an equal protection claim seems plausible. If
smaller counties have many more early hours than the larger,
then that could lead to just as much of a disparity as if the state
set a uniform low cap for early voting hours. This would be a
variation on the rule discussed above against mandatory
uniform early voting hours.
County discretion in Sunday voting seems less problematic
from the point of view of voter opportunity, again, so long as the
Sunday voting decision of counties does not cause inconsistent
treatment in voting opportunities in some counties rather than
in others.
Once again, any claims against county choice on Sunday
voting would depend upon an expansion beyond Equal
Protection uniformity principles. A decision to bar Sunday
voting in a county motivated by racial animus would be
unconstitutional
under the
Equal Protection
Clause.
Discrimination against the poor, against Democrats or
Republicans, or a challenge based upon a theory of
constitutionally-required convenience voting (such as no fault
absentee voting or early voting), or non-retrogression all raise
separate, non-uniformity Equal Protection issues.
Even if courts expand Equal Protection doctrine and accept
a theory of a right to convenience voting, it is not clear how to
measure "convenience." In Ohio, for example, Secretary of State
Husted required county election jurisdictions to send absentee
ballot applications to everyone in the state. Husted required this
step in the name of uniformity after a few (mostly Democratic)
counties
were
sending
such
ballot
applications
to
county voters. 35
the Court was seeking to deprive this case of any precedential value. See Chad Flanders,
Bush v. Gore and the Uses of 'Limiting", 116 YALE L.J. 1159 (2007).
35 See supra note 11; Secretary of State Husted Announces Details for 2014
Statewide Absentee Ballot Mailing, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, Aug. 20, 2014, available
at http: /www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/mediaCenter/2014/2014-08-20.aspx,
archived at
http://perma.cc/HA8T-QV7T ("In past elections, only a few boards of elections sent
absentee ballot applications to voters in their counties. This led to a disparity in access
and opportunity from county to county, which Secretary Husted has worked to address
whether the voter chooses to vote early by mail or in person. Our commitment to treating
all voters fair and equally, regardless of where a person lives in the state, gives every
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In a recent federal court case involving Ohio's reduction in
early voting days, the federal district court rejected the
argument that Ohio's practice of sending absentee ballot
applications to all Ohio voters was an adequate substitute for
expanded early voting. The court found that many AfricanAmericans did not trust the absentee balloting mechanism,
preferring to vote in person. 36 The court ruled that the reduction
from 35 to 28 days of early voting, which included eliminating a
Sunday "Souls to the Polls" day and the "Golden Week" in which
voters can both register to vote and cast an early ballot at the
same time, violated both the Equal Protection Clause and
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 3 7
One of the district court's theories for preventing the
moderate contraction of early voting appears to be that voting
Ohioan the same access to the ballot.").
36 Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808, 826-27 (S.D. Ohio
2014). Among the court's factual findings on vote-by-mail:
* Some voters do not trust voting by mail.
* "Some [voters] take pride in going to the booth and pulling the lever" and "for
some, as in the African-American community, [voting] is a cultural tradition
because it is a right that was fought hard for and they want to experience it in
person."

* According to Davis, Senate Bill 205 prohibits prepaid postage for ballots and
requires all fields on the ballot envelope to be completed.
* According to Fairchild, "[miany of the people from lower-income backgrounds
that I've worked with do not trust voting by mail. Even organizers do not
encourage it because it is a multi-step process where you must find postage,
mail-in an absentee ballot request, then find postage again, and mail in the
absentee ballot. Lower-income people with less educational attainment are
often living chaotic lives and are often unable to understand this process."
* According to Braxton, '"Vote-by-Mail' is not a sufficient alternative to [early
in person] voting. First, most of the people I interact with regularly do not even
pay their bills by mail anymore, so many people overlook traditional mail as a
means to cast their vote since it is not a traditional medium for voting. And,
second, minority communities I have worked with distrust the vote-by-mail
system and want to see their ballots actually processed."
Id.

I Id. at 852-83. After the Sixth Circuit refused to stay the order restoring days of
early voting, the Supreme Court, without issuing an opinion, stayed that order. Ohio
State Conf. of NAACP, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 851-52 (granting preliminary injunction), stay
denied pending appeal, 769 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 2014), aff'd on merits, 768 F.3d 524 (6th
Cir. 2014), stay granted sub. nom, Husted v. Ohio State Conf. of NAACP, 135 S. Ct. 42
(2014). On the Supreme Court's silence in this order and related orders issued in the
weeks before the November 2014 elections, see Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), draft available http://papers.
Principle, _
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2545676.
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must be greatly convenient to minority voters in order for a
state to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a
decision which if upheld could open up a whole new array of
voting rights claims. 38 The Court also seemed to adopt a nonretrogression theory of early voting: once a jurisdiction offers
days of early voting, they cannot be taken away. 39 It is not clear
how to square such a theory with the Equal Protection rights of
voters in states, such as New York, which offers no early voting
at all and uniform polling hours throughout busy and less busy
counties in New York. 40
If they stand, these theories go well beyond the uniformity
question, and could take Voting Rights Act and constitutional
Equal Protection claims in wholly new directions. My proposed
understanding of the uniformity principle does not require
courts to go this far. It only requires courts to recognize that
election administration rules premised on uniformity of counties
violate equal protection principles whenever the rule treats
differently populated counties the same but the rule
significantly affects the level of services provided to
individual voters.
V.

CONCLUSION

Who could be against uniformity in election administration?
The question turns out to be more complicated than it first
appears. Bush v. Gore,41 if it means anything, indicates that
sometimes lack of uniformity in election administration across
counties raises Equal Protection issues.
Uniformity in election administration often makes sense to
reduce confusion, enhance efficiency, and assure fairness of the
electoral process. But a problem also sometimes arises when
election administrators mandate uniformity across counties, and

3

Ohio State Conf. of NAACP, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 848-50.

39 id.
40 Rick Hasen, Breaking News and Analysis: Federal Court
Grants Injunction
Restoring Early Voting in Ohio, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Sept. 4, 2014), available at
http://electionlawblog.orgp=64964, archived at http://perma.cc/23WX-9RS3 (comparing
cutback in early voting in Ohio with the lack of any early voting in New York).
4' 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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people. In Jenness v. Fortson,42 the Supreme Court observed,
"[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating
things that are different as though they were exactly alike." 43
When the election administration rule significantly affects the
level of services to voters, the equality principle should be tied to
the number of voters and not the county unit. Otherwise the
laws treat voters in very differently populated counties as
though they were exactly alike.
Large counties, especially in urban areas with many new
and moving voters, face big election administration challenges
that are different from challenges faced by counties with small,
When state election
relatively unchanging populations.
administrators treat large and small counties uniformly, we
need to ask whether uniformity across counties creates Equal
Protection problems for voters. When uniformity creates these
problems, it is appropriate for courts to intervene.

42

403 U.S. 431 (1971).

43

Id. at 442.

